

PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B

BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling

A theme issue compiled and edited by Szabolcs Számadó, Daniel Balliet, Francesca Giardini, Eleanor A Power and Károly Takács

Published October 2021



THE
ROYAL
SOCIETY
PUBLISHING

About this issue

Large-scale non-kin cooperation is a unique ingredient of human success. This type of cooperation is challenging to explain in a world of self-interested individuals. This theme issue promotes an interdisciplinary approach that allows us to explore and to understand the evolution and the maintenance of reputation systems, with emphasis on gossip and honest signalling. The articles in this special issue draw our attention to the complexities of the workings of reputation systems, asking: (i) What are the necessary conditions for reputation-based systems? (ii) What is the content and context of reputation systems? (iii) How can reputations promote cooperation? And (iv) What is the role of gossip in maintaining reputation systems and thus cooperation?

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